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NOTES
WHICH WAY TO THE BEACH? PUBLIC
ACCESS TO BEACHES FOR
RECREATIONAL USE
Tidelands rhetoric sounded in South Carolina for a decade
before the passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act' in May
of 1977. Two premises underlay legislative efforts to control the
use and development of the State's coastal lands: the recognition
of the tidelands 2 as uniquely vital and vulnerable ecosystems critical to the protection of inland regions from erosion, flooding, and
storm damage, and the affirmation of the coastal zone as a resource of the whole State in which the public has clear economic
and social interests. The public interest in access to the seashore,
peculiar in its history and its character, is the subject of this note.
Specifically, what rights does the public have in access to beaches
for recreational use? Under what legal theories and legislative
enactments may these rights be defined and assured in harmony
with the rights of private landowners and with concomitant state
interests inthe preservation of the beaches?
This note surveys common law in South Carolina and other
states, pertinent statutory law outside South Carolina, and federal and state coastal management legislation bearing on questions of public access to beaches. A discussion of the public trust
doctrine in South Carolina sets out the public right to use the
foreshore or wet-sand beach. Leading cases from other states are
explored to illustrate the kinds of problems that have produced
litigation over the use and development of oceanfront property
and the theories advanced to resolve these conflicts. Several
South Carolina cases that will bear on future judicial determinations of rights of access are analyzed. Statutory law in other states
specifically addressing the question of public rights to beach acS.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -220 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. Id. § 48-39-10(G). The Coastal Zone Management Act defines "tidelands" as "all
areas which are at or below mean high tide and coastal wetlands, mudflats, and similar
areas that are contiguous or adjacent to coastal waters and are an integral part of the
estuarine systems involved." Id. For a discussion of the meaning of the term and the
importance of the whole tidelands area, see Wyche, The Law of Tidelands in South
Carolina,ENVIRONMENTAL LAw IN SouTH CAROLINA: SELECTED TOPICS (G. Poliakoff ed. 1977)
at 81-85.
1.
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cess is surveyed and compared in terms of its effectiveness with
the express and implied protections of the present South Carolina
legislation. Finally, the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act and the federal legislation that fostered the Act will be
examined with respect to their effects on existing and prospective
public rights of access to beaches.
Even without beach access legislation, existing South Carolina law supports public rights to recreational use of beaches, sets
out common-law tests to determine particular rights in particular
shorefront property, and provides specific protection of established public rights through laws effecting coastal zone permitting authority and erosion control.
I.

THE PUBLIC TRUST

DOCTRINE AND THE FORESHORE IN SOUTH
CAROLINA

The question of public rights to access and recreational use
of the seashore can best be addressed by delineating and considering separately the two contiguous strips of land generally at
issue: the foreshore or wet-sand beach, the land between the ordinary high- and low-water marks; and the dry-sand beach, the
land between the mean high-water mark and the line of vegetation.' The express purposes of recent legislation and the clear
weight of common law in South Carolina and other states' appear
to secure the public right to use the foreshore for recreational
purposes in South Carolina. The American doctrine of the public
trust forms the basis for public rights to the foreshore.5 The doc3. See Letter from Kenneth P. Woodington, Assistant Attorney General of South
Carolina, to John D. Bradley, I (March 30, 1977); See note 21 and accompanying text
infra.
4. For acknowledgment of state ownership and public rights in the foreshore as
"givens" in considering beach access, see Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common-Law
Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 369, 380 (1973); Note, Public
Access to Beaches, 22 STANFORD L. REv. 564, 565 (1970); and Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy on Public Use of the Beaches, 24 Syracuse L. Rev. 967, 968-69 (1973).
5. For discussion of the English common-law theory ofjus publicum, South Carolina
land grants, and the origin of the public trust doctrine in South Carolina, see Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), and Wyche, supra note 2 at 87-90.
In Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), the United States Supreme Court documented the historical development of the doctrine:
In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as settled that the
title in the soil of the sea, below ordinary high water mark, is in the King, except
so far as an individual... has acquired in it by express grant, or by prescription
or usage ... and that this title, jus privatum, whether in the king or in a subject,
is held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.
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trine creates a presumption and a right: title to the foreshore is
presumed to be in the sovereign unless title has been expressly
granted to the low-water mark; and the title is subject to the
public's rights to use the foreshore for navigation and fishing
whether the titleholder is the sovereign or a private citizen.
Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina
Canning Co.' is the leading South Carolina case recognizing the
common-law right of the public to the foreshore. The case arose
from a dispute over oyster beds leased to the defendants by the
State Board of Fisheries, but allegedly located on plaintiffs property. The court upheld a presumption of title in the State because
plaintiff's conveyance contained no specific language making the
low-water mark the boundary: "The title to land below the highwater mark on the tidal navigable streams, under the well-settled
rule, is in the state, not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in
trust for public purposes."' 7 Therefore, the leases by the State of

land between the high- and low-water marks were valid.'
The common law of England upon this subject, at the time of the emigration of our ancestors, is the law of this country, except so far as it had been
modified by the charters, constitutions, statutes or usages of the ...States or
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
In South Carolina, the rules of the common law, by which the title in the
land under tide waters is in the State, and a grant of land bounded by such
waters passes no title below high water mark, appear to be still in force.
Id. at 13-14, 25. This statement interpreting South Carolina law by Justice Gray speaking
for the Court was quoted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Cape Romain Land &
Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 435, 146 S.E. 434, 437
(1928), and in State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 540-41, 193 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1972).
For'a discussion distinguishing the doctrines of jus publicum and public trust as they
have been applied by various state courts, see Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav., supra note 4, at
380-90. See generally Clineburg & Krahmer, The Law Pertainingto Estuarine Lands in
South Carolina, 23 S.C.L. REv. 7 (1971).
6. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928).
7. Id. at 438, 146 S.E. at 438. The court bases this "well-settled rule" on Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); State v. Pinckney, 22
S.C. 484 (1884); State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884). See note 5 supra.
8. The prevailing defendants held a "lease from the board of fisheries of the state,
acting under an act of the General Assembly, covering all lands on which they were
operating." 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434, 436.
There has been continuing controversy stemming from the facts of Cape Romain.
Only 6.2 acres of the disputed 34,000-acre tract were located above the high-water mark.
Judge Cothran argued vigorously that the grant by the State to plaintiff therefore was
without effect unless the boundary was intended to be at the low-water mark. Cape
Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. at 439-42,
146 S.E. 438-40 (Cothran, J., dissenting). See Lane v. McEachern, 251 S.C. 272, 162
S.E.2d 174 (1968) (claimant proved title to an entire tract located below the mean highwater mark).
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The presumption of title to the foreshore in the State held
in trust for the public has been consistently confirmed in South
Carolina Supreme Court decisions.9 Of particular interest regarding the application of the public trust when title is not clear is
the language of the court in Rice Hope Plantationv. South Caro0 an action for damages resulting
lina Public Service Authority,1
from the construction and operation of a dam on the Santee
River. Citing Cape Romain with approval, the court did not decide the question of ownership: "[W]e do not deem it necessary
or proper upon this appeal to determine under what circumstances ...

title might be acquired by private owners, because any

such ownership would be, in our opinion, subject to the dominant
power of the government (State and Federal) to control and regulate navigable waters."" The significance of the Rice Hope holding is that the tidal character or navigability of waters bordering
the lands, rather than the determination of private or State ownership, makes the property between the high- and low-water
marks subject to the public trust.
The Cape Romain public trust doctrine is expressly incorporated in the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act with
an interesting addition. 2 At common law, an exception to the
The alienability of tidelands owned by the State has been judicially approved. See
cases cited in Wyche, supra note 2, at 101 n.109. For a discussion of alienability, case law,
and statutes affecting particular lands and interests, see id. at 101-06.
9. State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497 (1972); Rice Hope Plantation v.
South Carolina Public Service Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950). In Hardee
the supreme court, relying on the rule of Cape Romain as reaffirmed in Rice Hope,
enjoined the development of land below the high-water mark of Salt Creek at Pawley's
Island. Note Justice Bussey's lengthy opinion, concurring in the resulti but arguing that
the presumptions and the public trust language in Cape Romain and Rice Hope are dicta
and that tidelands continue to be subject to grant and private ownership in South Carolina. 259 S.C. at 543, 193 S.E.2d at 501. See also State v. Yelsen Land Co., 265 S.C. 78,
216 S.E.2d 876 (1976) (relying on Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. GeorgiaCarolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928), for presumption of title in the
state); State v. Beach Co., No. 75-cp-10-7 (9th Jud. Cir. S.C. July 20, 1977) (following
Cape Romain); County of Darlington v. Perkins, slip op. at 5-9 (C.P. Darlington County,
S.C. Sept. 17, 1976), aff'd., No. 20539 (S.C. Sup.Ct., filed Nov. 15, 1977). (The court
documents the public trust in common law, state decisional law, and in the State constitution, and notes that "private ownership does not otherwise alter application of the trust
doctrine." Id. at 9).
10. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
11. Id. at 530, 59 S.E.2d at 145. See also Wyche, supra note 2, at 92-94, 97-101, 107
(discussing the notion of navigability and concluding that for purposes of the public trust,
the terms "tidal" and "navigable" may be used interchangeably or with equal weight to
include lands in the trust).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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presumption of title in the State occurred when land accreted
beyond the original high-water mark.' 3 The resulting increase in
the dry-sand beach belonged to the owner of the property contingent to the accreted property. A controversial section of the South
Carolina Act empowers the Council to issue erosion control structures with the proviso that accreting or increasing oceanfront
property shall now accrue to the State, not to the private land
owner:
Provided ... that no person or governmental agency may de-

velop ocean front property accreted by natural forces or as the
result of permitted or nonpermitted structures beyond the mean
high-water mark as it existed at the time the ocean front property was initially developed or subdivided, and such property
shall remain the property of the State held in trust for the people of the State.'"
Retroactively applied, this proviso could be susceptible to attack
as an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation.' 5
Prospectively applied, the proviso would extend the presumption
of title in the State and the operation of the public trust restrictions to beach property below the high-water mark at the time of
development; these lands would otherwise have belonged to the
owner of the land accreted, free of the public trust. This naturally
accreted land would then be public land for the purposes of the
trust and by the proviso could not be developed by the State or
by a private person.
At common law, the scope of possible uses under the public
13. "Accretion" is defined as "the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land
by natural causes as out of the sea or a river." BLACK's LAW DiCTONARY 36 (4th rev. ed.
1968).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120 (Cum. Supp. 1977). A South Carolina Senate bill,
S.543, is now pending. The bill would repeal this proviso and leave only the language "that
no property rebuilt or accreted as a result of a permitted or nonpermitted structure shall
exceed the original property line or boundary." S. 543, 102d Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1978).
This amendment would limit the Act to a codification of the common-law rule that a
landowner may not use artificial means to increase his property by accretion. The Act
would no longer affect the common-law rule that naturally accreted land accrues to the
owner of the land increased. As at common law, the public trust would then continue to
include only lands below the presently existing mean high-water mark and not lands below
the mean high-water mark that existed at the time of the initial development or subdivision. Regarding the application of South Carolina law affecting accreted land, see Epps
v. Freeman, 261 S.C. 375, 200 S.E.2d 235 (1973); State v. Beach Co., No. 75-cp-10-7, slip
op. at 29 (9th Jud. Cir. S.C. July 20, 1977); and notes 80 and 100 and accompanying text
infra.
15. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text infra.
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trust extended only to navigation and fishing. Today the public
interest clearly extends to recreational use of the foreshore as
well; this is particularly true in South Carolina, where tourism is
a vital and critical industry. Although there has been no judicial
extension of the doctrine to include recreation in South Carolina,
there appears to have been no occasion for such a holding. 6 The

public trust doctrine has been interpreted to include recreational
purposes by various courts of other states 7 and by the South
8
Carolina Attorney General.'
The idea of the State managing land in the public trust is
central in coastal management legislation providing for the protection, restoration, and carefully regulated development of
coastal areas. The language declaring legislative findings and policies in the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act emphasizes recreational, natural, cultural, economic, and social values and clearly supports the inclusion of recreational activity
among the public purposes for which the State holds land for the
people.' 9 Recently the General Assembly, prefacing an act to control pollution from oil spills, also proclaimed "that the highest
and best use of the seacoast of the State is as a source of public
and private recreation."" ° The legislative intent of these two acts
16. See Wyche, supra note 2, at 107-16 (analysis of the scope of the public trust in
South Carolina).
17. See The Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296,
309-10, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (1972); Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc. 2d 279, 283, 310
N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (Sup. Ct. 1970); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 594, 462
P.2d 671, 679 (1969).
18. See [1964-65] Op. S.C. Arr'y GEN. 183.
The State of South Carolina has absolute title to Submerged Lands, (the area
below the mean low-water mark), in the navigable waters of the State. The State
of South Carolina has prima facie title to Tidelands (marshlands), (the area
between the mean high-water mark and the mean low-water mark), in and
adjacent to the navigable waters of the State. The State of South Carolina holds
the Tidelands, Submerged Lands and Navigable Waters in trust for and subject
to the public purposes and right of navigation, commerce, fishing, bathing,
recreation or enjoyment, and other public and useful purposes, or such other
rights as are incident to public waters at common law, free from obstructions
and interference by private persons.
Id.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-20 to -30 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
20. Id. § 43-43-520(1)-(2). The Act continues:
The General Assembly further finds and declares that the preservation of this
use is a matter of the highest urgency and priority, and that such use can only
be served effectively by maintaining the coastal waters, estuaries, tidal flats,
beaches, and public lands adjoining the seacoast in as close to a pristine condition as possible, taking into account multiple use accommodations necessary to
provide the broadest possible promotion of public and private interests.
Id. § 43-43-520(2).
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appears to embrace recreational use of the foreshore among the
public purposes protected by the public trust.
In summary, the doctrine of the public trust in South Carolina presumes that title to the foreshore is in the State unless the
conveyance expressly grants that land to the low-water mark.
Even if the title is unclear, the tidal character of the land impresses it with the public trust for public purposes. By implication and express statutory policy, these public purposes include
recreational use of the foreshore as well as the traditional rights
of navigation and fishing.
II.

THE BASIC QUESTION: PUBLIC ACCESS TO DRY-SAND BEACHES

The public trust doctrine supports only the right to public
use of the foreshore, the land between the mean high- and lowwater marks. Recreational use, however, ordinarily envisions drysand beach also, generally the area between the high-water mark
and the line of vegetation.2 ' Two problems arise from the interplay between the established legal right of the public to use the
foreshore and the growing public desire for recreational use of the
dry-sand beach. Mr. Justice Francis of the New Jersey Supreme
Court aptly phrases the first: "Since the people generally have
the common right to use and enjoy the ocean and the portion of
the beach below the mean high-water mark, of what utility is that
right if access from the upland does not exist or is refused by the
upland owner?

' 22

Second, what are the public's rights to use the

dry land for sunbathing, picnicking, strolling, shell collecting,
and similar recreational pursuits? Obviously public access is not
a problem at all until too little of it exists, by virtue either of
expanding recreational demands or of reduced access and available dry-sand space resulting from landowners' efforts to cut off
or limit established uses. Litigation over public access to beaches
for recreational purposes has arisen in two types of situations: the
first involves a landowner who attempts to reserve his beachfront
area by enclosure or obstruction for the exclusive use of paying
guests and, by implication, for other private uses. In the second,
a municipality attempts to restrict use of the beach when publicly
21. See Eckhardt, supra note 4, at 969 n.7 and accompanying text. The line of vegetation is generally understood to be "the extreme seaward boundary of natural vegetation
which typically spreads continuously inland." Id.
22. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. at 312, 294 A.2d
at 56 (Francis, J. dissenting).
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owned and operated beaches and their facilities become overcrowded.
The public does have rights to some dry-sand beaches. Various common-law theories and statutory pronouncements have
been advanced to confirm and protect public rights in the drysand beach for access and recreational use. The courts have confirmed public rights under the theories of prescriptive easement,
express and implied dedication, and customary right, relying on
traditional legal principles. The careful distinction underlying
these decisions, however, is the difference between creating a new
right and recognizing a right that has been legitimately acquired.
The courts generally agree with the Florida Supreme Court that
notions of the "need to preserve beaches for public recreation [do
not authorize] the taking of such beaches from their lawful owners. ' ' 2 Further, the idea has been resoundingly rejected that the
right of the public in the foreshore impresses all adjacent upland
24
property with an easement for access.
The cases discussed in this section represent major attempts
by the courts to resolve the questions of private and public rights
in beachfront property outside South Carolina. The cases are
divided into two groups: those involving public use of individual
tracts of privately owned property, and those involving nonresident use of municipally owned land. These decisions turn on the
application of the property law theories of easement by prescription, dedication, customary rights, and the public trust.
A.

Enclosure, Obstruction, and Established Public Right

Four leading decisions from states other than South Carolina
illustrate the theories successfully propounded on behalf of the
public right to beach access: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz,15 City
23. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 1972), rev'd
in part, 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
24. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. at 312-13,
294 A.2d at 56-57. Justice Francis observed that "the majority opinion disclaims any
positive ruling on the subject ... [G]enerally speaking reasonable access to the ocean
and to the land strip [foreshore] which is in the public domain cannot be denied, but
the law does not require that such access be without limitation or qualification." Id. at
312-13, 294 A.2d at 56.
Citing Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), the court in State ex rel. Thornton
v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969), distinguishes the easements in dry-sand beach
created by dedication, prescription, or grant and protected by Section 390.610 of the
Oregon Code (1967)(current version at Or. Rev. Stat. 390.610 (1977)), and a statutory
interpretation of § 390.610 that would declare an easement in all dry-sand beach: "The
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of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc.,2" State ex rel. Thornton
v. Hay,27 and Seaway Co. v. Attorney General.2s All five actions
(Gion was consolidated with another suit: Dietz v. King9 ) were
brought to enjoin the obstruction of access and use by barriers
erected on the dry-sand beach and on access ways leading to the
beach." In each case, copious evidence was presented of long,
continuous, and notorious public use of the beach areas, without
serious interference or permission 31 by the owner; public police
and sanitation services to the areas were also provided.32 In addition to common-law theory, each court pointed to some statutory
state concedes that such legislation cannot divest a person of his rights in land." Hay at
590-91, 462 P.2d at 674-75.
The Texas Court in Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) noted the State's argument that enjoyment of the seashore, held in trust for the
public, required a means of access: "[Tiherefore the sovereign has no power to cut off
convenient access. We know of no such rule of law." Id. at 930. Interpreting the applicable
statute, the court found the policy of the State to be "that the public shall have the
unrestricted right of ingress and egress to the State-owned beaches or ...to the seaward
side of the line of vegetation ...in the event the public has acquired an easement. . ....
Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
26. 271 So. 2d 765 (1972), rev'd in part 294 So. 2d 73 (1974).
27. 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
28. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
29. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
30. The courts focused on the dry-sand areas, and in Gion and Dietz, on the access
ways as well. In no case was the public right to use of the foreshore questioned. Representatives concerned with the public interest brought each action: the attorneys general
in Seaway and Thornton, the city in Gion, a citizens' group in Dietz, and a neighboring
landowner in Tona-Rama.
Although plaintiff in Tona-Rama framed his complaint in terms of public use, this
particular action may be styled a private use by the public. The plaintiff-landowner, who
protested the city's issuance of a building permit for his neighbor's observation tower, also
operated an observation tower on a nearby site. One might suspect that the second tower's
attraction of the public might be more injurious to plaintiff than any alleged deterrence
of public use. The standing of parties who are private citizens may present problems where
the appropriate public officer will not or cannot bring an action on behalf of the public.
See United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). In Save
Sand Key a nonprofit incorporated citizens' group alleged rights acquired by prescription,
dedication, and custom in an island owned by the defendant. The attorney general took
a voluntary nonsuit and the case was dismissed because plaintiff alleged no special injury
apart from injury to the general public.
31. In Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d at 933-36, and Gion v. City of Santa
Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d at 44, 465 P.2d at 60, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 172, the courts observed that an
owner's permission to a few people does not alter the rights acquired independently by
many people.
32. Only in Dietz v. King, which was heard with Gion, was there no municipal
service; but "the public nonetheless treated the land as land they were free to use as they
pleased." 2 Cal. 3d at 44, 465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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authority supporting the policy of public access to beaches,3 3 but
in no case was a statute controlling.
The common-law finding of an easement by prescription requires continuous use under a claim of right in the users, a use
adverse to the owner, for a statutory period.34 Plaintiffs in each
of the above cases alleged that the public had acquired an easement by prescription in the land at issue. In Tona-Ramathe court
refused to find an easement, holding that public use of the defendant landowner's beach was not adverse but rather in his interest
since he operated an ocean pier and other tourist attractions on
the same property. 5 The courts in Seaway and Thornton found
that easements had been acquired by the public, but both decisions rely only incidentally on this theory. The Gion and Deitz
court applied a common sense analysis, demonstrating that, regardless of legal presumptions, the real issues are factual and an
easement by prescription in the public requires essentially the
same proof as dedication by adverse use.3
The doctrines of implied dedication and customary rights
were more successful. Implied or common-law dedication includes the easement requirement of continuous use, without interference, under a claim of right in the users. Unlike prescriptive
easements, dedication does not ordinarily require a statutory period, applies only to a public claim of right, and requires the
owner's expression of intent or acquiescence in dedicating the
land for public use. Actual use by the public ripens into a right
and the dedication becomes irrevocable. The landowner's requisite intent in dedication theory, like the element of adverseness
in prescription theory, makes the analysis of asserted public
rights in shorelands strained.
Decisions applying a dedication theory show a wide range of
33. Texas and Oregon are pioneers in beach access legislation. See notes 97-131 and
accompanying text infra.
34. For an analysis of the characteristics of adverseness and claim of right in prescrip-

tive easements, see generally 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY §§ 1191, 1196, 1196.1, 1197 (3rd
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY].
35. 294 So. 2d at 77.
36. See 4 TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 1211. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29,
465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970), is cited as authority for the acquisition of highway
rights by prescription. "[Diedication can be proved by showing acquiescence of owner
under circumstances negating license or by establishing open and continuous use by
public for prescriptive period." 4 TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 1211 n.1.
37. For discussion of the general public as the only beneficiary of dedication, of the
owner's intention to dedicate as a question of fact, and of public use as evidence of
dedication, see 4 TIFFANY, supra note 34, §§ 1099, 1101-02.
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discretion in the degree of clear intent or acquiescence required.
In Seaway the court held that when an owner's visible conduct
encourages or does not seriously discourage public use, the owner
will be estopped to deny his intent to dedicate when the public
has acquired rights through continuous use.3" From the same kind
of acquiescence, the court in Gion found an intent to dedicate the
land or at least an easement in it. 9 Finding no intent to dedicate
and declining to presume this intent from acquiescence, the
Thornton court summarily dismissed the doctrine. 0
The Thornton decision resurrected the English doctrine of
customary rights, selected by the court for its simplicity and singular fitness to the efficient resolution of future dry-sand disputes. Acknowledging that many elements of prescription were
present in the case, the court announced a departure from established routes:
The most cogent basis for the decision in this case is the English
doctrine of custom. Strictly construed, prescription applies only
to the specific tract of land before the court, and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years with tract-by-tract
litigation. An established custom.., can be proven with reference to a larger region. Oceanfront lands from the northern to
the southern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly.4'
Emphasizing the "unique nature of the lands in question,"4' 2 the
court applied Blackstone's seven requisites of a particular custom: the use must be ancient, without interruption, peaceful,
reasonable, certain of description, obligatory to affected landowners, and not repugnant to or inconsistent with other customs or
law.4 3 This opinion suggests that the requirements of an adverse
public use or an intent to dedicate make prescription or dedication inappropriate to questions of public rights to use of beach
property. The Thornton court presumed instead that landowners
38. 375 S.W.2d at 935-37. But see 4 TIANY, supra note 34, § 1110 (distinguishing
the theories of dedication and estoppel and criticizing confusion of the doctrines by the
courts).
39. 2 Cal. 3d at 38-41, 465 P.2d at 55-57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 167-69. Note that Gion
applied a prescriptive period of five years. See note 25 supra.
40. 254 Or. at 592-93, 462 P.2d at 675.
41. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 595-97, 462 P.2d at 677 (citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMAENTARES *75-*78).
The requirement of obligation is interpreted to mean acquiescence without option or
question on the part of the landowner.
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have notice of the custom of public recreational use of dry-sand
beaches. The Thornton rule is held to be "salutary in confirming
a public right, and at the same time it takes from no man anything which he has had a legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his."44
The court in Tona-Rama cited Thornton in confirming public rights based on the customary use of the dry-sand beach.
Despite its approval of the doctrine, the court found for defendant, who had, after all, already completed his observation tower
on the beach. Because the construction of the tower was not inconsistent with public recreational use of the beach and violated
no acquired public right, its approval was not beyond the city's
authority to grant building permits. Dictum in the case provides
that even a public easement would not preclude the owner's use
of the land in any way consistent with the easement.45 The sweeping intent of Thornton was not adopted in Tona-Rama to affect
the entire coastline. The language of the Florida court plainly
envisions a parcelled approach: "The general public -may continue to use the dry-sand area for their usual recreational activities . . . because of a right gained through custom to use this

particulararea of the beach as they have without dispute and
without interruption for many years."4
The Tona-Rama decision highlights two limitations in any
confirmation of public rights in dry-sand beaches. First, a theory
confirming public rights would not prevent development that allows reasonable access and use of the land in question. Second,
avoiding tract-by-tract resolution of access conflicts in developed
areas may well be impossible, even under the customary rights
doctrine." Because it allows consideration of the realities of use
44. Id. at 599, 462 P.2d at 678.
45. 294 So. 2d at 77 (citing 3 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 811 (1939)). The court also

observed that the right of customary use does not create any interest in the land itself
and that the landowner cannot revoke the right, although the right is subject to
"appropriate governmental regulation" and may be abandoned by the public. Id. at 78.
46. 294 So. 2d at 78 (emphasis added).
47. Finding the Thornton ruling dispositive of the issue of public rights in the drysand beach, the Oregon Supreme Court applied its doctrine of uniform treatment of the
Oregon coast in State Highway Comm'n v. Fultz, 261 Or. 289, 491 P.2d 1171 (1971). But
a later Oregon Appellate Court decision confirmed the right of the public to acquire an
easement in the dry-sand area, citing Thornton without reference to customary rights.
State ex rel. Johnson v. Bauman, 7 Or. App. 489, 492 P.2d 284 (1971).
The issue in Johnsonwas whether the attorney general or the State Highway Commission was authorized by statute to bring a declaratory judgment action to find a recreational easement in property including foreshore and dry-sand up to and landward of the
vegetation line. Regardless of statutory authorization, the court could have disposed of
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and ownership, uncluttered by indicia of adverseness and intent,
the customary rights doctrine will probably be more useful for the
nature of proof it requires than for its universal applicability.
The specter of taking hovers at the fringes of every action
claiming an acquired public right. A uniform application of the
customary rights doctrine, without evidence pertaining to particular tracts, would appear to be as susceptible to constitutional
challenge as a statutorily declared easement for access in drysand and upland property." Asserting that the interpretation and
enforcement of the State statute by the Oregon Supreme Court
in Thornton effected a taking of their property without compensation, defeated defendants in Thornton brought their case to
federal court in Hay v. Bruno.49 The district court found that the
documented public use of the disputed property and the landowner's knowledge of this use supported the trial court's finding
of a recreational easement by implied dedication and the Oregon
Supreme Court's acceptance of that finding. Even though
Thornton was explicitly based on the doctrine of customary
rights, rather than on prescription or dedication, no taking could
occur by an "unpredictable change in the state's property law"5
when the factual burdens of proof to confirm an established public right in the property so clearly had been met."
Hay v. Bruno suggests, notwithstanding statutory policy
supporting public access to beaches and the doctrine of customary rights, that the resolution of disputed public and private
rights in the dry-sand beach will finally turn on factual determinations of the amount of public use of particular tracts. Whatever
the questions concerning the land seaward of the vegetation line if the Thornton holding
were controlling. Therefore, it is not clear whether the customary rights theory will be
controlling in all Oregon dry-sand disputes.
48. See Black, Constitutionalityof the Eckhardt Open Beaches Bill, 74 COLUM. L.
Rav. 439 (1974) and note 15 and accompanying text supra, and note 140 and accompanying text infra.
49. 344 F. Supp. 286 (D.Or. 1972).
50. Id. at 288-89. The court distinguished Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967),
in which the Supreme Court overruled a state court decision that had suddenly altered
Washington law regarding the ownership of accreted land. Public rights and the
landowner's knowledge of public use in Bruno long preceded statutory expression or judicial affirmation of the easement in question. 344 F. Supp. at 289.
51. 344 F. Supp. at 289. Acknowledging the State court's discretion to elect its own
theory, the district court pronounced that "the decision of a state court on a question of
law, even though wrong and contrary to previous decisions, does not constitute a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it is wrong or because it reverses earlier
decisions." Id. (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907)).
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legal theories are used, judicially defensible confirmation of public rights in privately owned dry-sand beach will require proof of
extensive public use of that particular land.
Two recent Maryland decisions illustrate a different focus in
strictly applying common-law theories to protect private interests. In Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean
City,52 the State and a rear-beach landowner sought to enjoin
condominium construction and the issuance of a building permit
by the City. The eastern front of the building was to be located
on the dry-sand beach seaward of the vegetation line. The court
affirmed the public right to use the foreshore but denied the
injunction: "[The petitioners are attempting . . .under an as-

sertion of the public's right to picnic and sunbathe on the dune
. . .to deny the Developer a use of his property to which he has

an otherwise lawful right."53 Because a 1962 storm had severely
eroded the land at issue, evidence of public use of that dry-sand
area as a beach extended back only a few years. Finding that
"[i]mplying a dedication solely through long public use without
regard to any intent to dedicate on the part of the landowner is
but a form of prescription,""4 the court concluded that the evidence of public use after 1962 could not support an easement by
prescription or a customary right. The court reached the same
conclusion in a companion case based on similar facts.55
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Eldridge insisted that evidence
of public use and government expenditure for sanitation, police,
lifeguards, and preservation of the beach, both before and after
the 1962 storm, created a "total picture of an implied dedication."56 He maintained that the "exceptional nature of the ocean
beach,"57 as well as "compelling public interest"" should preclude construction and abrogation of public rights, at least seaward of the vegetation line. 9 The developer's claim might have
been defeated by evidence of customary use of the beach as it
existed before the 1962 storm. The storm may have brought him
a literal windfall.
52. 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975).
53. Id. at 13, 332 A.2d at 637.
54. Id. at 8, 332 A.2d at 635.
55. Department of Natural Resources v. Cropper, 274 Md. 25, 332 A.2d 644 (1975).

56.
A.2d at
57.
58.
59.

Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 274 Md. at 22, 332
642.
Id. at 15, 332 A.2d at 639.
Id. at 22, 332 A.2d at 642.
Id.
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The Maryland decisions demonstrate what Hay v. Bruno
suggested: the resolution of conflicts among developers, established residents, and the general public will turn on state court
application of common-law theories to evidence of public use of
a particular tract. Regardless of statutory presumptions, every
state will require a very high level of public use to confirm a
public right in the dry-sand area. Some liberality in the court's
construction of the elements of adverseness of public use and the
owner's intent to dedicate will be necessary to preserve acquired
public rights on the basis of prescription or dedication. Under any
theory, the tendency of the courts to focus on the infringement
of public rights by private owners, as the Gion, Thornton, and
Seaway decisions suggest, or on the infringement of private rights
by public use, as the Maryland cases suggest, may also be determinative. The task of securing public rights will be most difficult
when the court does not accept the theory of implied dedication
-and the doctrine of customary rights is not advanced or is inappropriate. Finally, because the decisions have not clearly distinguished between the right to use the dry sand as a way of reaching the foreshore and as a recreational area, we must assume that
the tests to confirm these public rights are the same, at least insofar as the strip of land between the high-water mark and the
line of vegetation. The case law discussed illustrates that public
rights in this dry-sand area are clearly in a state of flux.
B. God Must Have Loved the Public: Too Much of a Good
Thing
A second group of cases, arising from overcrowding at municipal beaches, involves nonresident challenges to city ordinances
that restrict access to beaches and beach facilities to residents.
In Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea,60 the
New Jersey Supreme Court defined the public trust doctrine as
including recreational use of the foreshore and found that the
upland area had been unequivocally dedicated to public beach
purposes. Striking the ordinance at issue, which charged a larger
fee to nonresidents than to residents for the use of the beach, the
court held that the statute authorizing municipalities to charge
beach user fees was a delegation of the state's police power over
a dedicated beach.
60. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
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[Wihere the upland sand area is owned by a municipality - a
political subdivision and creature of the state - and dedicated
to public beach purposes, a modem court must take the view
that the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the
ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without
preference and that any contrary state or municipal action is
impermissible.'
The decision allowed Avon to "limit, on a first come, first served
basis, the number of persons allowed on the beach at any one time
in the interest of safety." 2 Plaintiff nonresidents in Gewirtz v.
City of Long Beach63 were also successful in invalidating an ordiance restricting the use of a beach park to Long Beach residents
and their guests. As in Avon the New York court emphasized the
legislative delegation of public trust authority to the municipality
and held that the original dedication of the park by local law to
the general public had become irrevocable through thirty years
of public use and city maintenance.
In Avon and Gewirtz the dedication of upland beach to public use operated to include these dry-sand areas in the public trust
held by the state and delegated to the city government. Under
this theory, public rights to use of these beaches then fell within
the ambit of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 According to Professor Black of Yale University, "the
'public,' for purposes of the 'public' easements and 'public' dedications that are the technical forms under which beaches are
lawfully open, is the 'public' or the people, of the United
States."6 5 Beach access or use in areas where public rights have
been secured by easement or dedication cannot be denied nor fees
differentiated on the basis of residence in that municipality.
Nevertheless, beach communities obviously bear a heavy
61. Id, at 308-09, 294 A.2d at 54.
62. Id. at 311, 294 A.2d at 56.
63. 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1972). For a discussion of the city's use of
federal funds for beach and oceanfront improvements as a factor in the court's decision,
see Comment, 2 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 301, 338-45 (1974).
64. For a detailed discussion of the denial of equal protection argument, see Note,
48 N.Y.U.L. Rev., supranote 4 at 390-93.
For an antidote to bureaucratic means of resolution and for what may be the quintessential assertion of the public right, see State v. Mizrahi, 149 N.J. Super. 143, 373 A.2d
433 (1977). The conviction of hapless bather Mizrahi, apprehended badgeless on his towel
on the foreshore of Margate City, for violating the city's ordinance by not purchasing a
beach admission badge and resisting arrest, was upheld, despite his pleas of jus publicum
and the fourteenth amendment.
65. Black, supra note 48 at 441.
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burden because of the unique attraction of the seashore. The
obligation of the municipality does not extend beyond the protection of confirmed public rights in the beach itself. Recent community efforts to restrict the use of limited beach facilities have
been more successful. In Van Ness v. Borough of Deal66 a New
Jersey Appellate Court allowed the city to reserve its beach club
and a portion of upland dry-sand area for the exclusive use of
Deal residents. In Van Ness the dry-sand area had never been
dedicated, access to the foreshore was unimpaired, and other reasonably necessary changing and toilet facilities were available.
The New Jersey court found similar factors in Hyland v. Borough
of Allenhurst"7 and refused to extend the Avon equal protection
rationale to beach facilities or to preclude the city from charging
higher nonresident fees for beach club membership.
More so than with privately owned property, the problems
involving municipally owned beaches should be amenable to resolution by legislation and state and regional planning. When public use of state beaches forces local expenditure for municipal
services beyond what is reasonably returned in ordinary tourist
spending, legislative authorization of fees for access, parking, and
other facilities or state funding assistance for beachfront services
may help to allocate the financial burdens of beach maintenance."8 Coastal management planning that encourages the dispersal of beach visitors by providing reasonable access points,
open shore space, and available parking along the coast may
prevent problems of the Avon variety.69
C. South Carolina:Dedication, Prescription,and Dry Sand
As in other states, South Carolina case law suggests that
confirming a prescriptive easement or implied dedication of drysand areas will command a heavy burden of proof regarding the
nature and extent of public use. In South Carolina, too, prescription and implied dedication theories are closely related, and both
are commonly advanced to secure public rights. A prescriptive
easement requires a clear showing of continuous and uninterrupted use, adverse or under a claim of right, for a twenty-year
statutory period.70 The party asserting dedication must show
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

145 N.J. Super. 368, 367 A.2d 1191 (1976).
148 N.J. Super. 437, 372 A.2d 1133 (1977).
See notes 127-131 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 140-145 and accompanying text infra.
Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S.C. 342, 348-49, 72 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1952).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1978

17

644

SouthSOUTH
CarolinaCAROLINA
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 29,
Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 5
REVIEW

[Vol. 29

"strict, cogent, and convincing" proof of acts on the part of the
landowner that are "not . . . consistent with any construction
other than that of a dedication" and "an express or implied
acceptance, evidenced either by public use or by the acts of the
public authorities."" The doctrine of customary rights has not
been advanced in South Carolina.
Two cases involving access ways and lakeside landing recreational areas illustrate the South Carolina Supreme Court's application of the theories of dedication and prescription to factual
circumstances similar to those producing beach access litiga74 were private citizens who had
tion.73 Plaintiffs in Tyler v. Guerry
used a disputed road and landing; in County of Darlington v.
5 the attorney general associated with the county as
Perkins,"
plaintiff." On the surface, the cases are similar: in each action
plaintiffs sought the declaration of a public right-of-way in a road
leading to a lake and a permanent injunction against the landowners' interfering with public use of the landing area. In Tyler
the court reversed and found neither dedication nor easement in
the defendants' property. In Perkins, however, the court found
that the road had been dedicated as a public right-of-way and
that the public had acquired rights in the landing area by prescriptive use.
71. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Fairfax, 80 S.C. 414, 430, 61 S.E. 950, 956 (1908),
quoted in Tyler v. Guerry, 251 S.C. 120, 126, 160 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1968). Note also another
oft-cited requirement of proof to establish dedication: "[Tihe conduct of the owner ...
clearly, convincingly, and unequivocally [must indicate] expressly or by plain indication,
a purpose or intention to create a right in the public to use the land adversely to him and
as of right." Town of Estill v. Clarke, 179 S.C. 359, 362, 184 S.E. 89, 90 (1936); accord,
Livingston v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 1122 (D.S.C. 1969); Derby Heights,
Inc. v. Gantt Water and Sewer Dist., 237 S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d 13 (1960); Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S.C. 342, 72 S.E.2d 699 (1952). See also Note, What Constitutes Intent to
Dedicate, 6 S.C.L.Q. 96 (1953-54).
72. Woodside Mills v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 356, 359 (W.D.S.C. 1958).
73. County of Darlington v. Perkins, No. 20539 (S.C. Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 15, 1977);
Tyler v. Guerry, 251 S.C. 120, 160 S.E.2d 889 (1968).
74. 251 S.C. 120, 160 S.E.2d 889 (1968).
75. No. 20539 (S.C. Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 15, 1977).
76. The trial court observed that the State associated with Darlington County as
plaintiff because
this case represents one of the many increasing conflicts directly impacting
public use of the State's waters. As public demand of protection of what may
be conceived as public rights increases, so by necessity does State involvement.
The ancient public rights in navigation, in fishing and in recreationassociated
with waters are, without question, in greater demand today than ever before in
the State's history.
County of Darlington v. Perkins, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Darlington County, S.C. Sept. 17,
1976), aff'd, No. 20539 (S.C. Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 15, 1977) (emphasis added).
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The cases may be distinguished on their facts. Evidence of
public use of the roads and the landing and of county road maintenance was more extensive in Perkinsthan in Tyler. In its refusal
to find a public right-of-way the Tyler court considered the abandonment of the old road and the owner's obvious efforts to deter
public use of the new road. 7 In Perkins the landowners wanted
to charge fees for access and use of the landing, but had not
obstructed the way. The court in Perkins found that the public
character of the road leading to the landing required the conclusion that the landing itself was "improved" and, therefore, subject to the public claim of right. In Tyler the court had placed
considerable reliance on the finding that the landing area was
unimproved, unenclosed woodland that had not been used for
boats, as the landing in Perkins had, and was, therefore, not a
proper public landing.78
Significantly, the court in Tyler applied the restrictive test
of intent to dedicate: the owner's act must not be "'consistent
with any construction other than . . . dedication.' "I' In con-

trast, the court in Perkins applied the test of whether "a reasonable inference of an intention to dedicate may be drawn" from
the owner's acts." The test applied in Perkinsis plainly less stringent because it allows the intent to dedicate to be "manifested
by the owner's acquiescence in continuous use of the land by the
public under the claim of a general public right."'"
Analogizing the tests applied in these decisions to beach access questions, we may surmise that dry-sand beach used for
77. The old road, which had been used for access to the river for over 50 years, was
abandoned when the new road was built in 1958. People continued to use the new road.
In 1961 or 1962 defendant owners put up a "no trespassing" sign, which was not effective,
and in 1966 they blocked the road with chains and barbed wire, which were removed.
Finally, they dug trenches in both roads to obstruct their use. 251 S.C. at 125-26, 160
S.E.2d at 890-91.
78. 251 S.C. at 124, 160 S.E.2d at 890. Citing State v. Randall, 32 S.C. Law 48, 1
Strob. 110 (1846), the court defined the term "landing" as "'a place on a river or other
navigable water for lading and unlading goods, or for the reception and delivery of passengers.' " Id. at 124, 160 S.E.2d at 890. The landing in Tyler was explicitly held not to
fit this definition. The court observed that a prescriptive right cannot be created in "wild,
unimproved, unenclosed woodland," implying that use of the area as a landing renders
the land improved and susceptible to adverse claims.
79. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Fairfax, 80 S.C. at 430, 61 S.E. at 956, quoted in Tyler
v. Guerry, 251 S.C. at 126, 160 S.E.2d at 891.
80. No. 20539, (S.C. Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 15, 1977) (citing 23 AMt. Jur. 2d Dedication
§ 21 (1965)).
81. Id. (citing 23 AM. JUR. 2d Dedication §§ 28-29 (1965)) (emphasis added). This
language seems to be a deliberate departure from the stricter requirements of other decisions.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1978

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

public recreation is as much a place of public significance as a
landing on a navigable body of water. The Perkins decision suggests that when public rights-of-way lead to dry-sand beaches
South Carolina courts will consider evidence of public use, public
maintenance, and public interest, applying the theoretical and
evidentiary tests employed in Tyler and Perkins. The apparent
tendency of the court to relax its requirement of an unmistakable
intent to dedicate and the association of the attorney general, as
in Perkins, may ease the burden of plaintiffs seeking to confirm
a public right. Any public interest argument for rights of access
to the foreshore and use of dry-sand ocean beach may be inherently stronger than claims to lake shorefront property simply because of the particular recreational tradition associated with the
seashore.
Two recent South Carolina cases involving accreted dry-sand
property may influence the resolution of conflicts between public
rights to recreational use of beaches and private rights of beach
ownership."2 Three kinds of interests are at issue: front-lot owners'
rights of access and use of the dry sand between their property
and the ocean; developers' ownership claims to accreted land
between front-lot property and the foreshore; and public rights of
access and use of the dry-sand beach. These South Carolina cases
show that the peculiar susceptibility of oceanfront property to
change by erosion and natural or artificial accretion may cause
established beachfront owners and proponents of the public interest to become allied in actions to prevent development between
existing buildings and the ocean.
In Epps v. Freeman 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court
observed at the outset that land between the high-water mark
and the original subdivision line had been "dedicated to the lot
owners and public for common enjoyment."84 A strip of land between the subdivision line and the front-lot owners' seaward
property line, which was swash or submerged land at the time of
development, had been filled by front-lot owners, creating dry
land. The court found that this land accrued neither to those
adjoining owners who had created dry land out of the swash nor
to the original subdividers, whose heirs sought title to the prop82. Epps v. Freeman, 261 S.C. 375, 200 S.E.2d 235 (1973); State v. Beach Co., No.
75-cp-10-7 (9th Jud. Cir. S.C. July 20, 1977).
83. 261 S.C. 375, 200 S.E.2d 235 (1973).
84. Id. at 377, 200 S.E.2d at 236.
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erty. The original platting of the land in dispute as an open area
within the subdivision in front of the divided lots was held to be
intended by the subdividers as a "representation that the area in
question would remain open to the sea for the benefit of the lot
purchasers .... [T]he defendants have a special property interest therein, whether by implied grant, estoppel, or otherwise,
which bars plaintiffs from [their claim]."5
The defense that the disputed land had been dedicated to
"defendants and to the public in general""6 was enumerated, but
not addressed by the court, apparently because the evidence presented was not primarily of use by the general public. The practical effect of this decision on public use remains as clouded as
plaintiffs' title. Could the defendant front-lot owners sell their
"special property interest" to plaintiffs and thus clear their title?
This failing, defendants' special interests preclude development
of the property, but their lack of title would also appear to prevent their denying others use of the property unless the use interfered with their interests. In that event, the dedicated beach has
been extended for all practical purposes to the land in dispute.
It is more likely that defendants would seek to purchase plaintiffs' interests in the land, valuable now only to defendants,
thereby gaining title to the land for themselves. Since no public
interests in the beach have been confirmed, defendants apparently would then be free to develop the property or use it as they
wish.
The precedential value of the Epps decision is uncertain. It
may suggest that the court is loath to confirm title in accreted
dry-sand property when the effect would be to bar customary
recreational use, whether by private residents or by the public in
general. But the controlling theory is one of equitable estoppel,
which is to be applied against a developer when private owners
85. Id. at 388-89, 200 S.E.2d at 242. The evidence plainly did not support the defendants' claims of adverse possession. Since the new land was artificially accreted, the plea
of title by accretion at common law was removed. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text
supra.
86. Id. at 379, 200 S.E.2d at 237. Citing Cason v. Gibson, 217 S.C. 500, 61 S.E.2d 58
(1950), defendants relied on the grantee-landowner's rights to assert the grantor-

developer's dedication of adjacent property to the public, whether or not the dedication
had been accepted. There was no attempt to demonstrate general public use of the dis-

puted beach. Since defendant landowners in Epps operated motels, the finding of a special
property right was probably the desirable result for them, because it allowed continued

use of the beach by their guests and confirmed no rights in the general public. Brief of
Respondents at 52-54. For discussion of dedication in this case, see also Brief of Appellants
at 123-24 and Record at 514-17.
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buy and improve property in reliance on the developer's representations that the land between their lots and the ocean will remain
undeveloped.
State v. Beach Company,17 a recent circuit court decision,
suggests that the level of public use required to establish dedication or prescription will be quite high. In this widely publicized
action to enjoin the leveling of sand dunes by the defendant
developer-landowner on naturally accreted beach, the court
found dedication in the eastern end of the disputed beach area,
but not in the wider western area. The court did approve public
easements "for access to the water at the ends of the cross
streets"" ' on the undedicated western end and extended these
easements across the accreted dry-sand beach. The use of these
pathways was so obvious that the Beach Company conceded the
right.89 Although the State asserted dedication by acquiescence
and public use and the court acknowledged greater evidence of
eastern use, the case actually turned on plats of the earlier development. Arguments on appeal will probably abandon commonlaw dedication by prescription or implication and rely on the
disputed plats and on an unusual 1927 South Carolina act accepting certain dedications from earlier developers."
Beach Company again illustrates the common interests of
beachfront landowners and the general public in preserving the
status quo of established beaches. The court noted initially that
numerous actions of beachfront landowners 'claiming private
easements and rights-of-way between their lots and the foreshore
were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of this suit.9
Suits by these property owners landlocked by the accreted front
beach might come to life if the State's action fails. These actions
would involve claims of easements for access to and use of the
whole beach. The confirmation of these private easements would
probably bar any development of the accreted beachfront areas
in dispute.2
The trial court in Beach Company emphatically stated that,
where dedication to public use is confirmed, dedication protects
87. No. 75-cp-10-7 (9th Jud. Cir. S.C. July 20, 1977).

88. Id., slip op. at 15.
89. Id.
90. No. 324, 1927 S.C. Acts 770; telephone interview with Kenneth P. Woodington,
Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina, in Columbia, South Carolina (March 3,
1978).
91. State v. Beach Co., No. 75-cp-10-7, slip op. at 5 (9th Jud. Cir. S.C. July 20, 1977).
92. Telephone interview with Kenneth P. Woodington, note 90, supra.
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public rights in the land from intrusion by private owners, in this
case, for example, by destruction of the sand dunes.93 Dedication
cannot be revoked by adverse private uses without clear abandonment by the public.9 4 Land naturally accreted onto land dedicated to public use will be subject to the same dedication or
easement.9 5 But the public rights confirmed in this case werd not
strongly contested on the basis of public use alone and the questions of rights to access and use of dry-sand beaches were not
definitively framed in terms of prescription and implied dedication. A South Carolina Supreme Court ruling in the Beach
Company case probably will not provide a controlling precedent
in this area.
In summary, the South Carolina courts appear to be liberalizing older notions of implied dedication and upholding strong
protections for land dedicated to public use. Because questions
of accretion and of construction of plats and deeds have quite
properly borne on every access decision rendered, the dispositions
of actions involving conflicting public and private claims in
oceanfront property are difficult to predict. Almost certainly
more litigation will arise from situations similar to those in the
Epps and Beach Company cases, when developers who retain a
strip of beachfront property claim naturally accreted land between existing developed beachfront lots and the ocean.9"
IR.

CODIFICATION OF EXISTING RIGHTS

A review of public beach access laws suggests some useful
means for protection of existing public and private rights. Statutory provisions of California,9 7 Guam,9" Hawaii,9" Oregon,,"
Texas, 0°' and the Virgin Islands'012 are surveyed in this section.
93. No. 75-cp-10-7, slip op. at 18-20 (9th Jud. Cir. S.C. July 20, 1977). For a discussion of the leveling as a public nuisance, see id. at 20-28.
94. Id. at 10, 11, 19. For a discussion of the abandonment of public rights in beaches,
see Note, HawaiianBeach Access, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 845-47 (1975).
95. No. 75-cp-10-7, slip op. at 11, 29 (9th Jud. Cir. S.C. July 20, 1977).
96. Interview with Jean H. Toal, South Carolina State Legislator, in Columbia,
South Carolina (March 15, 1978). Actions are now pending in th&Cherry Grove and North
Myrtle Beach areas in South Carolina. Arguments based on theories of dedication, public
and private easement, equitable estoppel, and on the Coastal Zone Management Act, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 48-39-120 (Cum. Supp. 1977) are contemplated. For discussion of this provision of the Act, see also notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
97. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 53035-53036, 54091-54093 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
98. GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 13450-13460 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
99. HAW. REv. STAT. § 115 (Supp. 2 1975).
100. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 390.605-.630 (1977).
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Beach access legislation is directed generally at setting public policy to protect the right to public access and use of beaches,
to prohibit interference with these rights, to provide for confirming existing interests, and to authorize the acquisition of access
ways. Definitions of the shoreline affected by the legislation uniformly include the stretch of dry-sand beach inland to the vegetation line.' 3 Provisos in Texas and the Virgin Islands go further by
stating that dredging and filling will not alter the line for purposes of the law.'0
The individual statutes vary in their focus on access to the
shore and use of the beach; however, both the rights of dry-sand
use and the right-of-way to the sea probably were intended to be
included in each piece of legislation. The protection of "free and
uninterrupted use [of the ocean shore], ' ""' the "right to use and
enjoy the shorelines,"'0 6 a "fundamental right of free movement
in public space and of access to and use of the sea,"'0 7 and the
"free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from"
the beach are stated as policies of the acts.' 8 The state's protection is clearly intended to extend only to shore land "where such
use has been legally sufficient to create rights or easements in the
public through dedication, prescription, grant or otherwise."'0 9
Texas also provides that in an action brought under the Act land
seaward of the vegetation line carries a prima facie "prescriptive
right or easement in favor of the public for ingress and egress to
the sea . . . subject to proof of easement.""' To the extent that
public rights are acquired, beaches become public recreational
resources of the state."'
101. TEX. NATURAL RESoURCEs CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.001-.131 (Vernon 1977).
102. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 402-403 (Supp. 2 1976).
103. GUAM Gov'T CODE § 13453 (Cum. Supp. 1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 115-5 (Supp.
2 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 390.605 (1977); TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, §
61.012 (Vernon 1977); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 402(b) (Supp. 2 1976).
104. TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.017(a) (Vernon 1977); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 402(b) (Supp. 2 1976).
105. GUAM GOV'T CODE § 13451 (Cum. Supp. 1974); OR. REV. STAT. §390.610(1)

(1977).
106. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 402(a) (Supp. 2 1976).
107. HAW. REV. STAT. § 115-1 (Supp. 2 1975).
108. TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.011 (Vernon 1977).
109. GUAM Gov'T CODE § 13450(d) (Cum. Supp. 1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 390.610(2)
(1977). For the same effect see TEx. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.011-.012
(Vernon 1977), and V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 402(a) (Supp. 2 1976).
110. TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.020(2) (Vernon 1977).
111. See GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 13450(d), 13455-56 (Cum. Supp. 1974); OR. REV. STAT.

§ 390.610(3) (1977) (provisions for territory or state administration). For public rights as
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The statutes expressly or implicitly prohibit interference
with public rights.' 2 State officers are empowered to deal with
bars to public access by bringing actions to enjoin restraints"'
and to "protect, settle, and confirm all such public rights and
easements.""' 4 Texas landowners are specifically given the corresponding right to determine their interests by bringing declaratory judgment actions."5 Guam allows a beachfront owner to file
a declaration of the rights that he permits the public to have in
his property. The statement is "admissible as evidence of the
intent of the owner ... to exercise dominion and control over his
property.""' 6 Government acquisition of property for beach access
is specifically authorized in California, Guam, Hawaii, and Oregon. 117
Beach access litigation in the states with strong legislative
policies supporting the protection of confirmed public rights in
beaches indicates that the statutes may provide some presumptive support, but are not dispositive. Although Seaway Co. v.
Attorney General' 8 and State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,"9 two of
the cases discussed above, were brought under beach access
laws in Texas and Oregon, the legislation in each adds little to
the analysis of the rights at issue. The statutes do provide a clear,
but probably unnecessary justification of a state's right to bring
actions to enforce this particular kind of public right.'20 Probably
because he preferred to avoid the constitutional question of the
the trigger to public protection, see TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§
61.001(5), .013, .018 (Vernon 1977).
112. TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.013 (Vernon 1977); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 403 (Supp. 2 1976).
113. TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.018 (Vernon 1977).
114. GUAM GOV'T CODE § 13451 (Cum. Supp. 1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 390.620(1)
(1977).
115. TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.019 (Vernon 1977).
116. GUAM GOV'T CODE § 13460 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See discussion of common-law
theories of prescriptive easements and implied dedication in notes 34-37 and 70-72 and
accompanying text supra. Evidence of an owner's permission that his property be used
can defeat a public claim of right based on use adverse to the owner.
117. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54093 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1977); GUAM GOV'T CODE §
13456 (Cum. Supp. 1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 115-2 (Supp. 2 1975); OR. REV. STAT. §
390.630 (1977).
118. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
119. 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
120. See cases discussed in Section I A and II C. Public officers apparently have not
been challenged in bringing actions on behalf of public rights in beaches, whether specific
statutory authority existed or not.
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"taking" effect of this legal presumption, the Texas attorney general did not rely on that statute's prima facie easement provision
and based the case instead on extensive public use of the beach.,2
Hay v. Bruno,'2 allowing the Oregon Thornton decision to stand,
holds that the statutes are defensible in this respect precisely
because the protection provided is conditioned on the confirmation of an existing public right at common law. Therefore, the law
has not been changed in a way that takes property away from the
owner.
In United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., '2 another decision which specifically addresses the validity of beach
access legislation, the government based its action on the Virgin
Islands Open Shorelines Act.12 4 Defendant was enjoined from future obstruction and ordered to remove fences erected seaward of
the vegetation line. Reciting evidence of notorious public use of
the beach in question, the court found that the Act "merely
[codified] this confirmed right" and was not unconstitutional
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.1 2 Furthermore, the
vegetation line description of affected shoreline was considered to
"pass the [void-for-vagueness] constitutional muster with flying
colors."'' 1 Even so, the decision suggests that an action based on
public access rights could not succeed under any legislation without supporting evidence of extensive public use. The policy and
presumptive value of the statute were undeniably significant, but
were not solely determinative.
Texas and California deal specifically with the effects of public rights to beach access on oceanfront communities. California
provides that public beaches and public property used as access
ways to beaches must be open to all persons on equal terms and
conditions without discrimination on the basis of "color, race,
religion, ancestry, national origin, sex or residence."12 1 Moreover,
121. TEx. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 61.020 (Vernon 1977). See Note,
Open Beaches Act: Public Rights to BeachAccess, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 383, 387, 389 (1976).
For comments on the congressional determination of a presumption of a public right to
beach access and the basis of this right in custom and history, see Black, supra note 48,
at 446-47.
122. 344 F. Supp. 286 (D. Or. 1972).
123. 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974). The court found that the submerged land on
which the fences were constructed belonged to the United States. Id. at 771.
124. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 402-03 (Supp. 2 1976).
125. 386 F. Supp. at 772.
126. Id. at 773.
127. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54902 (West 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
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local agencies may not transfer real property affording access to
the shore without reserving the public right of access or making
an alternative route available.'28 Texas law delegates to shore
counties and municipalities the authority to regulate beach
traffic and littering.'2 9 Further, it finds that the public policy of
open beaches creates "a responsibility for the state... as trustee
for the public to assist local governments in the cleaning of beach
areas which are subject to the access rights of the public ....
The Act makes State funds available for beach maintenance
upon the applicant's meeting certain conditions, among them
free entrance to all public beaches and the establishment of at
3
least one beach park by the applicant county or city.' '
State laws regarding public access to beaches plainly parallel
litigation of questions involving disputed privately owned property and controlled access to municipally owned beaches. Apparent from the subsequent litigation is the failure of the laws to
answer the basic questions of what public access and recreational
rights to beaches are protected. The deterrent effect of the legislation is not known. State coastal management programs subject
to federal coastal management regulations and addressed to more
comprehensive problems of preservation and development may
be more effective in resolving and reducing conflicts arising over
public use of dry-sand beaches.
IV.
A.

COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION

The Need for State Control

The South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act is indicative of the acute national awareness of the promise and the problems of the oceanshore. The Act repeats verbatim congressional
findings in the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 197232
that
(b) The coastal zone is rich in a variety of natural, commercial, recreational,industrial, and esthetic resources of immediate and potential value to the present and future well-being of
the Nation;
(c) The increasing and competing demands upon the lands
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. § 53036.
TEx. NATURAL REsouRcEs CODE ANN.tit. 2, § 61.122 (Vernon 1977).
Id. § 61.062.
Id. § 61.068, .069(4)-(5).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1972).
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and waters of our coastal zone occasioned by population growth
and economic development, including requirements for industry, commerce, residential development, recreation, extraction
of... fossil fuels, ... navigation, waste disposal and harvesting
of fish, . .. have resulted in the loss of living marine resources,
. . . permanent and adverse changes to ecological systems,
decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline erosion.'33
These conclusions are supported in the legislative history of the
Federal Act.'34 Presently the nation's seven largest metropolitan
areas and half its population are located in the counties bordering
the Great Lakes and oceans. By the year 2000 there will be an
estimated two hundred million shoreline county residents. Housing development is predicted to pose the greatest threat to the
preservation of tidelands areas.' 5
With 187 miles of oceanfront beach, 2700 miles of shoreline, 36
603,200 coastal county residents"' and an expected increase in
this number to 752,300 by the year 1990, South Carolina's conformity with this national picture is obvious.'3 The General Assembly found that "present state and local institutional arrangements for planning and regulating land and water uses in such
areas are inadequate." '39 The findings emphasize concern that the
State regulate its own coastal zone: "A variety of federal agencies
presently operate land use controls and permit systems in the
coastal zone. South Carolina can only regain control.., by developing its own management program . . . [and by encouraging]
the state and local governments to exercise their full authority
over the lands and waters in the coastal zone."'4 0
133. Id. § 1451(b)-(c); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (empha-

sis added).
134. See S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Seass. 1, 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1768, 1771-72.
135. The Senate Committee on Commerce, recommending passage of the 1976
amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, discussed findings of various
reports by the Interior Department, the National Ocean Policy Study, and the Technology
Assessment Advisory Council of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. For
a thorough exposition of the factual background and professional recommendations leading to support of this legislation, see id. at 1768-87.
136. Wyche, supra note 2, at 81.
137. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BULL. No. 76-40 (1977).
138. Div. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICAL SERVICES, S.C. BUDGET AND CONTROL BD.
POPULATION PROJECTION STUDY FOR 1990 (1976).

139. No. 123, § 1(F) 1977 S.C. Acts 225.
140. Id. § 1(C). The federal agencies referred to here include the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Wildlife and Fisheries, and the Federal Power
Commission. Note, however, that in 1969 six federal bills were introduced in Congress that
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The opportunity for the exercise of state and local authority
is clear. The 1976 amendments to the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act make formulation of a specific plan for access to
public beaches"' mandatory for states seeking planning development grants under the Act;' the amendments authorize funds
for assistance in implementing these management plans.' Proposed federal rules under these sections require that a state identify shorefront areas appropriate for public access, articulate
state policies regarding shorefront access, and indicate available
funding programs and management techniques.' The new legislation, "represents a determination ... to give further emphasis
to protection of and access to the [oceanfront] areas mentioned.
[I]t is . . .not a mandate ... to provide any specific protection
and access."' 45
The South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act created
an eighteen-member Coastal Council empowered to hire staff
members, to develop a management program for the State, and
to provide for the administration and enforcement of the program.'" The structure of planning that affects access to South
declared a prima facie public right of access to the sea in the area seaward of the vegetation line. Discussion of the Eckhardt "Open Beaches Bill" continued for at least four
years. Because the 1976 amendments to the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act provide only threshold, essentially advisory, requirements, it is unlikely that legislation will
long preclude interest in a federal enactment in this mode. See Eckhardt, supra note 4;
Black, supra note 48; and Comment, Easements: Judicial and Legislative Protectionof
the Public'sRights in Florida'sBeaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 586, 595 (1973).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b) (1976) requires that the "management program for each
coastal state shall include ...(7) A definition of the term 'beach' and a planning process
for the protection of, and access to, public beaches ....
"
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (1976) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (1972)) provides for
grants to any coastal state for assistance in the development and completion of a management program and for the initial implementation of the program. The 1972 Act required
that a plan be completed and development funding ended before a state was eligible for
implementation funds. When § 1454(b) was amended by the 1976 Act to add beach access,
the environmental impact of energy facilities, and erosion control as planning factors,
interim periods of overlap funding became necessary. Id. § 1454(b) (1976) (amending id.
§ 1454(b) (1972)).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1976) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1972)) provides for annual
administrative grants for any state program meeting requirements of § 1454 and § 1455.
These grants are limited to 80% of the state's costs. Id. § 1455 (1976). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1461
(1976) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1461 (1972)), which formerly provided for 50% grants for
acquisition of estuarine sanctuaries, now also allows acquisition funding for lands to
provide access to beaches and to preserve islands. A 1972 proviso precluding the use of §
1454 and § 1455 funds for acquisition under § 1461 has been eliminated. Id. § 1461 (1972).
144. 43 Fed. Reg. 8402 (1978) (shorefront access and protection planning).
145. S.REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1768, 1801.
146. S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-40 to -50 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Under the 1976 amend-
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Carolina beaches, the definition of "public beaches," and the
determination of existing rights in the ocean shore will emerge
from South Carolina statutory and common law and from policy
and regulations
promulgated under the coastal management pro47
gram.

,

B. The South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act: A
Perspective
That South Carolina public policy supports the public right
to access and use of state beaches is apparent in the form and
substance of the C6astal Zone Management Act.' The administrative standards established for coastal construction, the development of erosion control policy, and the incorporation of local
laws into the management plan provide important safeguards
and planning opportunities in the area of beach access. Coastal
Council staff members predict that specific provisions regarding
public use of beaches will emerge as policy statements in the
management plan, rather than as additional legislation.' Final
Rules and Regulations of the South Carolina Coastal Council 5"
emphasize the environmental and economic importance of the
tidelands, the "strong and growing pressure for the development
of these areas," 5 ' and the need not to prohibit development, but
ments and regulations promulgated under these amendments, beach access plans are to
be submitted after Oct. 1, 1978 and before Sept. 30, 1979. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(b),(i); 43
Fed. Reg. 8403 (1978).
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-80 provides as follows:
The Council shall develop a comprehensive coastal management program, and
thereafter have the responsibility for enforcing and administering the program
in accordance with the provisions of this act and any rules and regulations
promulgated under this act. In developing the program the Council shall:
(A) Provide a regulatory system which the Council shall use in providing for the orderly and beneficial use of the critical areas.
(B) In devising the management program the Council shall consider all
lands and waters in the coastal zone for planning purposes.
(emphasis added). Note that "beaches" are "critical areas" under id. § 48-39-10.
148. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -220 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
149. Interview with Harriett Knight, Coastal Council staff planner, in Charleston,
South Carolina (Dec. 28, 1977).
150. 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7, 14 (1978). These regulations were proposed to the 1978
South Carolina General Assembly pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 48-39-50(C) (Cum. Supp. 1977), and will take effect ninety days after their
submission unless disapproved by the General Assembly, pursuant to the South Carolina
Administrative Procedures Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120 (Cum. Supp. 1977). These
regulations become final on June 7, 1978, and copies may be obtained from the Office of
Coastal Planning, 4 Carriage Lane, Suite 205, Charleston, South Carolina 29407.
151. Rule 30-11(A), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 37 (1978). See also Rule 30-1 (A), id.
at 20-21; Rule 30-1(B), id. at 21-22.
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to realize "the range of favorable and unfavorable results . .. ,
determine priorities, evaluate alternatives, anticipate impacts,
and suggest the best methods and designs to carry out wise development of these resources.'

152

Highlighting the significance of

beaches, the Statement of Policy records that "aesthetically, the
beaches are a unique experience, and recreationally, these areas
'
are increasingly needed."15
It is this uniqueness that makes
South Carolina beaches desirable development locations and
makes sound regulation "essential to protecting the resources as
well as protecting lives and property."'5 4
1. PermittingAuthority
The South Carolina Coastal Council is empowered "[t]o
examine, modify, approve or deny applications for permits for
activities covered by [the Act]":

155

specifically, construction in

"critical areas of the coastal zone."' 5 Beaches are designated as
critical areas.' 57 As in other states, the statutory definition of

beaches, "those lands subjected to periodic inundation by tidal
and wave action so that no non-littoral vegetation is established,"'5 8 includes the foreshore and the dry-sand area to the line
of vegetation. Because "primary ocean front sand dunes" are also
critical areas,"' the dry-sand beach subject to the Council's licensing authority extends to the "landward trough" of a front
152. Rule 30-1(A), id. at 21.
153. Rule 30-1(B), id. at 21.
154. Rule 30-1(B), id. at 22.
155. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-50(G) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
156. Id. §§ 48-39-30(B)(1), -130.
157. Id. § 48-39-10(J).
158. Id. § 48-39-10(H). See also Rule 30-10(B)(1), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 36 (1978).
The Rule quotes the statutory definition and elaborates: "The boundary of the beach
critical area shall extend from the waters landward to a point that is not periodically
inundated by tidal or wave action; this point is usually delineated as the landward edge
of the beach zone where nonlittoral vegetation begins." Id.
Council and staff members interpret "periodic inundation" to mean the highest point
tides might normally reach over a long period of time (not including hurricane tide) as
opposed to the more specific, astronomically based definition approved by the United
States Supreme Court: "the average height of all the high waters over.., a period of 18.6
years .... " Borax Consol. Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935), rehearing
denied, 296 U.S. 664 (1935). "Nonlittoral vegetation" is that plant life that could not
survive in areas of periodic inundation; therefore, the line of vegetation is an indication
of the point where periodic inundation does not reach. Interviews with Harriett Knight,
Coastal Council staff planner, and Rick Dawson, staff biologist, in Charleston, South
Carolina (Dec. 28, 1977); telephone interview with Ben Gregg, Council staff attorney (Feb.
15, 1978).
159. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10(J) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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dune if its crest is within 200 feet of the mean high-water mark
or to the seaward side of a permanent building located seaward
of a primary dune and within the 200 feet area. 160
The Act provides that as a critical area, beach property cannot be subject to "a use other than the use [it] was devoted to"
on September 28, 1977, without a permit from the Coastal Council. 6 This provision would appear to have the effect of conditionally freezing the use and development of shoreline property and
thereby preserving acquired rights in that land." 2 Construction or
development that might restrict preexisting access to beach areas
now must be approved by the Council upon considerations including "[tihe extent to which the development could affect
existing public access to ...beaches or other recreational coastal
resources.' '6 3 The Council is further required to hold a public
hearing on any permit application at the request of twenty affected citizens, and it may condition a permit "upon the applicant's amending the proposal to take whatever measures the
Council feels are necessary to protect the public interest."'6 4 Construction in violation of the Act can be restrained by a circuit
court with jurisdiction "at the suit of the Council, the Attorney
General, or any person adversely affected."'' 5
Concerning the question of access to and use of beaches, the
protection afforded by the Council's permitting authority is two160. Rule 30-10(B), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 37 (1978).
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Note the ninety day grace
period to allow notice. Section 130(C) states that:
a person who has legally commenced a use [in a critical area before September
28, 1977] such as those evidenced by a state permit or issued by the Budget and
Control Board, or a project loan approval from the Rural Electrification Administration or a local building permit or has received a United States Corps of
Engineers or Coast Guard permit, where applicable, may continue such use
without acquiring a [Coastal Council] permit.
Id. § 48-39-130(C). Section 130(C) also requires permits for all dredging, filling and construction in critical areas. Id. Section 130(D) excepts emergency government action, minor
routine hunting, fishing, and research structures, and other maintenance and sanitation
activities otherwise permitted by law. Id. § 48-39-130(D).
162. Unless the public simply abandoned its use of an access way or stretch of beach,
any development would be subject to review by the Coastal Council with past and continued use as a factor in the determination of a project's feasibility.
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-150(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See note 167 and accompanying text infra.
164. Id. § 48-39-150(B). Section 150(D) provides for appeal to the Council by an
applicant denied a permit or by "any person adversely affected by the granting of the
permit." Id. § 48-39-150(D). Whether an applicant must demonstrate an adverse effect
different from that on the general public is not clear. See notes 24 and 158, supra.
165. Id. § 48-39-160. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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fold: existing public access to beaches must be considered in
granting or denying permits, and beaches and primary sand
dunes are protected as critical areas subject to permitting authority. The Council will probably construe the term "public access"
to mean routes used to reach the beach, as opposed to meaning
the accessibility of beaches to the public for general use- 6 Therefore, permitting decisions would take into account whether proposed development would interfere with customary public use of
upland pathways and streets leading to the beach as well as ways
across the dry sand itself. A permit could be made conditional on
the preservation of those rights-of-way. Additionally, it is likely
that protection of the beach and front dunes as critical areas will
also have the effect of preserving dry-sand areas for customary
recreational use.
The Coastal Council is mandated to approve or deny permits
based on the individual merits of the application, the policies set
forth in the Act, and ten comprehensive biological, ecological,
economic, and social considerations. That the Council is not
authorized to decide questions of ownership is explicit in the Act,
which provides that actions to determine "any right, title, or
interest" in the tidelands must be brought against the State by
serving process on the State Budget and Control Board and that
State law affecting these interests can be changed only in this
manner. 118 Draft regulations emphatically support the intentional
exclusion of ownership questions from the Council's power.,"
166. Interview with Harriett Knight, Coastal Council staff planner, and with Ben
Gregg, Council staff attorney, note 158 supra.
See No. 123, § 10 1977 S.C. Acts 233. Section 10(A) provides for Coastal Council
assistance to local governments; section 10(B) provides for Council evaluation and approval of a current ordinance affecting critical areas under the Act. Section 10(C) allows
a local government without current ordinances that conform to Act requirements to elect
to develop its own program for critical areas; section 10(D) provides for a local government's delegation of its section 10(C) responsibility to the appropriate regional council of
government.
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-150(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977). In addition to existing public
access to beaches, the considerations also include "[tihe extent of the economic benefits
as compared with the benefits from preservation," id. § 48-39-150(A)(7), and "[t]he
extent to which the proposed use could affect the value and enjoyment of adjacent owners." Id. § 48-39-150(A)(10). See also Rule 30-11(B), 2 S.C. State. Reg. No. 7, at 37-38
(1978) (incorporating the statutory considerations).
168. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-220(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
169. Rule 30-4(F), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 27 (1978): "No permit shall convey, nor
be interpreted to convey, a property right in the land or water in which the permitted
activity is located. No permit shall be construed as alienating public property for private
use or as alienating private property for public use."
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When public or private rights are disputed in property for
which a permit is sought, the resolution of conflicting claims
logically should precede any permitting decision. Since the Act
requires that a party seeking a permit provide evidence of his
interests in the affected property, another party claiming interests in the land should be able to bring an action to enjoin the
Council from permitting the activity until the rights in the property are determined pursuant to the Act.1 7 Because the action
provided in section 48-39-220 is essentially a suit to determine
interests in the property, the attorney general should be able to
bring an action asserting public rights in the property.
In addition, where dry-sand beach property beyond critical
areas that has been used customarily by the public is threatened
by construction otherwise likely to be allowed, the traditional
judicial action to enjoin activity that would interfere with public
rights in the property remains. Whatever the fact situation, the
viability of this course of action would depend to some degree on
the ability and willingness of the attorney general or of some
concerned private party to initiate a public claim.
2.

Erosion Control

Coastal Council authority to develop and institute erosion2
control policy,"' to issue permits for erosion control structures,'
and to expend public funds for shore erosion control in "areas
where the public has full and complete access"'' 7 3 should also have
the effect of preserving beaches for public access and use. The
proposed regulations express a clear preference for the "use of
natural features of the dune and beach system rather than artificial protection .... -,71
Among the criteria considered in permit170. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-140(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Coastal Council policy
regarding uncertain but officially unasserted public rights in "private" land is unsettled.
It is not unlikely that public interests may be asserted as the basis for appealing a permit,
where the Council has granted one in reliance on the applicant's claim of ownership. On
the other hand, where a permit is denied, apparently because of doubtful claims, the
issues may be raised by the purported owner either in an action under § 48-39-220 or in
an appeal of the permit denial.
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
172. Id. § 48-39-120(B).
173. Id. § 48-39-120(D) authorizes the Council to accept and administer federal
funds. Section 120(E) provides for the use of available state funds in the event of "beach
or shore erosion emergency." Id. § 48-39-120(E).
174. Rule 30-13(A)(2)(a), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 52 (1978), excepts from this
policy "critically eroding shorelines that have a direct measurable effect on the economic
well-being of an applicant or are a threat to the public safety."
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ting jetties and groins is that "care . . . be taken to insure that
they do not interfere with public access . . . .",75 Recognizing the
importance of the beach and dune system "to storage of sand and
shoreline stability ... [and] as a barrier which protects adjacent
inland areas," the Statement of Policy finds that "enough room
[should] be allotted between structures and the shoreline so that
if natural erosion occurs, natural deposition can restore the beach
. ... "17 In the event of natural or artificial accretion, provisos
affecting the Coastal Council's erosion control authority require
that land seaward of the mean high-water mark that existed at
the time of development remain undeveloped.1 7 All of these specifications in erosion policy and application should promote the
permitting only of erosion control devices and other structures
that are consistent with existing public use and access.
The term "existing public access" must be defined (1) for
purposes of the federally required management plan for public
access,'7 1 (2) as a required consideration in every permitting decision,1 79 and (3) as a condition precedent to the use of public
funds. 80 Logically, the term should be defined in a single way.
Because erosion control is critical in so many areas, the condition
attached to funding may work to lower the level of use required
to constitute public access for purposes of erosion control as well
as for the permitting of all construction. The clear requirement
that public access be a factor in any permitting decision for erosion controls and the policies of preserving and protecting critical
beach areas will be significant in the preservation of existing
public rights of access and use of beach property.
3.

Local Ordinances

The third means of protecting and assuring public access
rights afforded by the Coastal Zone Management Act is the
Council's power to approve local ordinances affecting critical
areas as part of the overall plan. 8' Ordinances dealing with criti175. Rule 30-13(C)(2)(c), id. at 54.
176. Rule 30-1, id. at 22.
177. S. C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120 (Cum. Supp. 1977). For discussion of the provisos,
see note 14 and accompanying text supra. For South Carolina cases involving accreted
land, see notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
178. See notes 141-45 and accompanying text supra.
179. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-150(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).

180. See note 173 and accompanying text supra.
181. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-100(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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cal areas that do not meet the requirements of the Act would be
superceded by the Act and the implementing regulations of the
Council. When critical areas are not involved, the Council has no
authority over specific local ordinances that might affect public
access to beaches. The Council does, however, have a duty to
cooperate with local governments and to make "[r]ecommendations to local and regional governmental units as to needed
modifications or alterations in local ordinances. . .

.,,s

These

recommendations will surely be influenced by developing interpretations of the .federal regulations concerning the consideration
of public access to beaches in the management plans.1ss
The most powerful tool of municipalities is subdivision regulation.' 4 By considering beaches to be a necessary kind of open
space and access ways as essential to the enjoyment of that space,
the Council might recommend that shorefront communities require developers at least to dedicate public easements to preserve
existing rights-of-way to the ocean.' 5 A recommendation that
182. Id. § 48-39-100(A).
183. See notes 141-45 and accompanying text supra.
184. For a discussion of subdivision exactions as a tool to insure adequate public
rights to beach access, see Note, 22 STANFORD L. REv. 564, supra note 4 at 567-72.
185. The Beaufort County proposed ordinance suggests one approach. Its impact is
limited since the developer is not required to provide reasonable access, if negotiations
involving the County's purchase of land are unsuccessful.
Section 5.3.2.2. PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS REQUIRED. Public beach access
shall be provided by the developer for any development including more than
one-thousand (1,000) feet of beach frontage according to the provisions of Sect.
5.3.2.3.
Section 5.3.2.3. OPTION TO PURCHASE BEACH ACCESS. Upon filing of
a preliminary application for an oceanfront development plan with the Planning
Commission, Beaufort County shall have an option to purchase reasonable
beach access as deemed necessary for the general welfare and benefit of the
public. The county's option to purchase beach access shall run from the date of
first submission of plans to the Planning Commission, to the date of the second
regular County Council meeting following the first regular meeting of the Planning Commission after submission.
The Planning Commission shall review a proposed oceanfront development as
to the need for public beach access and shall recommend to County Council
what action it feels the county should take as regards public beach access area
in the best interest of the general public. The County Council shall notify the
developer of the intentions on the option by the end of the specified option
period, and shall, if electing to purchase the beach access area(s), have a period
of thirty (30) days, and one extension period of thirty (30) days, from the end
of the option period, to negotiate the terms of the purchase with the developer.
The County Council may cause to be made an appraisal of the required beach
access area(s) by a board of at least three (3) independent appraisers in order
to establish the basis for a purchaser offer to the developer for the beach access
area.
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development plans insure reasonable access routes, adequate drysand space, and parking facilities for members of the community
and for visitors would be advisable. In many cases these-requirements would effect confirmation of existing rights in previously
undeveloped property by incorporating frequently used beaches
and pathways into development plats as dedicated public areas.
These types of provisions would alleviate some of the problems
involving conflicts over particular areas and overcrowding where
access is difficult or not proportionate to the permanent and tourist population of the region.
South Carolina enabling law provides that subdivision regulations under local governing authority may "provide for the harmonious development of the municipality and the county," permit "the dedication or reservation of land for streets, school sites
and recreation areas," and encourage "a distribution of population and traffic which will tend to create conditions favorable to
86
health, safety, convenience, prosperity, or general welfare.'
The above proposals concerning local development regulation
would surely fall within the delegated police power and would be
easily related to the public health, safety, and welfare. If requirements for development of subdivisions include only the reservation of public rights in access ways and in the dry-sand beach
critical areas below the vegetation line, unreasonable taking or
arbitrariness of application should not be problems. The regulations would simply reflect the controlling policy of the South
Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act and its parent legislation.
When established communities find their access ways and
open-beach space for public use inadequate, acquisition authority and some federal funding may be available.8 7 Additionally a
municipality might provide for an administrative determination
of existing rights similar to that of a declaratory judgment, available at the request of a landowner or the municipality. Where
public rights are confirmed or acquired or where the owner
chooses to make a formal dedication, the city would assume sani186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-7-1030 (1976).
187. The South Carolina Coastal Council does not have eminent domain powers.
Because of the substantial state ownership of beaches here and the probability of only
limited available funds, it is unlikely that South Carolina would attempt to qualify for
federal acquisition funds by virtue even of another state agency's power. Interviews with
Harriett Knight, Coastal Council staff planner, and with Ben Gregg, Council staff attorney, note 158 supra. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-30(C) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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tation and police services in the area as it presumably would
when newly developed property is dedicated. 8 '
Through its recommendations and approval authority the
Coastal Council can substantially influence the shape of local
ordinances, not only to protect public rights, but to insure that
private beachfront landowners and municipalities do not bear an
unfair share of the costs of public use. A provision for additional
state financing of necessary beach services may ease the burden
in communities where beaches are especially popular and accessible. 8 ' Requirements for local planning that assure reasonable
access to the whole oceanfront of the State should work to prevent
overcrowding and to preserve beaches for recreational use by
coastal residents and the general public.
V.

CONCLUSION

By the public trust doctrine expressed in Cape Romain Land
& Improvement Co. v. Georgia-CarolinaCo. and subsequent case
and statutory law, the right of the public to use the South Carolina foreshore for recreational purposes is clear. The controls imposed on dry-sand beaches below the vegetation line by the South
Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act place that land in trust
for the people to protect the land from erosion resulting in preservation of the beaches for continued recreational use.
Historically, conflicts concerning public access to beaches
have arisen when rights-of-way to the shore or particular areas of
dry-sand beach were enclosed or obstructed so that people could
not reach the foreshore where the public's right to use was clear.
Successful actions to confirm public rights under these circumstances in South Carolina on any theory of prescription, dedication, or custom will require extensive proof of continued use. This
State should be able to avoid some of the problems that have
produced litigation elsewhere by the comprehensive regional and
local planning mandated by State and federal coastal zone management legislation.
Taken together, the individual provisions of the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act provide as much or more
188. Public services are a material indication of a public right by prescription or of
acceptance by the public of a dedication of land. A landowner in whose property the public
has acquired rights should be able to receive services commensurate with that public use.
189. For Texas law dealing with these problems, see notes 129-131 and accompanying
text supra.
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protection of public rights in beaches as do the specific statutes
providing for these rights in other states. Furthermore, the policies and procedures of the Act require planning for existing as
well as prospective beach access rights in undeveloped, established, and already overcrowded areas. The exercise of South Carolina Coastal Council regulatory authority will be central in determining the development of coastal areas and in protecting and
insuring public rights to recreational use of beaches.
Mary Lowndes Bryan
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